Matthew Duss

Strategic Confusion

Brian Katulis and I have an op-ed in today's Baltimore Sun. Here's the money:

In their testimony before Congress this week, Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker and General David Petraeus portrayed recent clashes between competing Iraqi factions as a fight between the Iraqi government and Iranian-supported groups looking to undermine that government. This simplistic "good guys versus bad guys" depiction masks a much more complicated reality in which U.S. policy in Iraq unwittingly strengthens Iran's overall hand there and around the region. [...]

Over the past five years, Iran has hedged its bets, maintaining ties and offering support to all of the major Shiite factions in Iraq, including Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, which fought pitched battles with the Iraqi army and the Badr Corps last month. But Americans should be clear about where Iran's closest allies are in Iraq. They are at the highest levels of the Iraqi government.

On Basra

Some commentary on what happened in Basra and after.

Abu Aardvark reflects.

Eric Martin on the same clowns always predicting the end of Sadr, at it again.

Spencer Ackerman on how Sadr drew a box around the surge.

Joe Klein on how the Fred and Kimberly Kagan, collectively, don't really know much about Iraq.

My Wonk Room post on how John McCain doesn't really seem to know much, either.

Little Help

Ahmedinejad in Iraq:

Mr Ahmadinejad's visit has come without the assistance of the United States.

US forces are not involved in security for the visit and did not provide helicopters to transport Mr Ahmadinejad into central Baghdad.

Instead he had to travel by car along the usually dangerous road from the airport to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's residence near the US-controlled Green Zone.

There, he was warmly greeted by Mr Talabani as he walked down a red carpet past an honour guard.

Imagine that: A head of state visiting Iraq without having to sneak in and out. And I have to quibble with the BBC here: Ahmedinajad's visit has come with a lot of assistance from the United States. We spent almost $600 billion to remove Iran's greatest enemy and install the pro-Iranian Shiite government that welcomed Ahmedinajad to Baghdad.

Definitely Maybe...Success!

Anthony Cordesman's column in today's Washington Post summarizes the findings of his recent CSIS report on security in Iraq (which has been hailed in the usual corners as evidence that "We're Winning!"). This passage is emblematic of the report's qualified and hesitant predictions of something very much like success:

Meaningful victory can come only if tactical military victories end in ideological and political victories and in successful governance and development. Dollars are as important as bullets, and so are political accommodation, effective government services and clear demonstrations that there is a future that does not need to be built on Islamist extremism.

The military situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are very different. The United States and its allies are winning virtually every tactical clash in both countries. In Iraq, however, al-Qaeda is clearly losing in every province. It is being reduced to a losing struggle for control of Nineveh and Mosul. There is a very real prospect of coalition forces bringing a reasonable degree of security if decisions such as Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's announcement Friday to extend his militia's cease-fire six months continue over a period of years.

Right. There is the "very real prospect" of "reasonable degree of security" if the leader of Iraq's version of Hezbollah continues to cooperate. Do I really need to go any further? The fact that people like Charles Krauthammer are seizing upon this as evidence of success shows both how well they've been able to transform the Iraq debate into an argument over tactics, and how far they've been willing to climb down from the war's original goals, all while attacking Democrats for being defeatist.

Brand New Iraq, Only Six Hundred Billion Dollars! Who Wants To Play?

Continuing to man the "Surge Success!" booth at the Bush Country Fair, neocon carnie Reuel Marc Gerecht looks at the bright side of life:

Regarding the Iraq war and jihadism, two facts stand out. First, if we make a comparison with the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-89, which was the baptismal font for al-Qaeda, what's most striking is how few foreign holy warriors have gone to Mesopotamia since the U.S. invasion in 2003.

What's impressive about this is that for years the Bush administration and the neocon apparat relentlessly inflated the numbers of foreign fighters in Iraq, first in an effort to deny the genuinely indigenous, nationalist nature of the insurgency (after first denying the insurgency's existence for over a year), and then to tie Iraq to the broader war on terror by over-representing al-Qaeda's role there (something which only caused al-Qaeda's stock to rise in the Middle East). Don't you remember, these guys had a whole "flypaper" theory worked out, in which terrorists from throughout the region would be attracted to Iraq, and, immediately after getting off the bus ("Baghdad! Just like I pictured it! Minarets, and everything!") stumble into a hail of American machine-gun fire. There was just one tiny flaw in the plan: It was bollocks. Jihadis didn't just come and die, though many of them did, they came and learned. They experimented, refined, innovated, and generally took great advantage of the terrorism laboratory with which the U.S. provided them. Though fewer mujahideen traveled to Iraq than did to Afghanistan, thanks to the power of the internets they have been able to have an immeasurably greater effect in the dissemination of terrorist propaganda, methods and tactics throughout the world.

Gerecht:

A second striking fact about Islamism and the Iraq war is that the arrival of foreign holy warriors is deradicalizing the local population -- the exact opposite of what happened in Afghanistan...If bin Ladenism is now on the decline -- and it may well be among Arabs -- then Iraq has played an essential part in battering the movement's spiritual appeal.

First, I suppose if you define "radicalism" as "Wahabbism", this is true. But, of course, Wahabbism was never popular in Iraq, at least not until the U.S. got there. As for Islamism, it is now effectively the law of the land. Second, I simply can't keep up with how often these guys seem to redefine success in Iraq. Understand that Gerecht himself previously wrote that "As long as [bin Laden] lives, we have lost the war against radical Islamic terrorism" ...and now he celebrates the possible, maybe, could be, you never know, decline of "bin Ladenism" as a benefit of the Iraq war. (I'm sure the hundreds of thousands of dead and maimed Iraqis are grateful to have contributed to this possible, maybe, could be, you never know outcome.) While on a darkly satirical level I appreciate that Gerecht's new line of pro-war bull directly contradicts previous lines of pro-war bull, it must be understood that there is simply no way to draw a smiley face on all this, no calculus that can justify the costs of this debacle, no way that the Iraq war ends up as a net positive for the region, or for the U.S. Any productive debate over where to go from here must begin with that.

(cross-posted to TAPPED)

Flawed and Ugly

Reuel Marc Gerecht celebrates President Bush's creative destruction:

Although the White House often seems bedeviled by the task of defining "victory" in Iraq, it really isn't that hard. Flawed and ugly as it is, Iraqi democracy stumbles forward. The Shiite and Sunni Arabs are slowly establishing representative political arrangements within their own communities that allow some diversity of opinion.

Leaving aside the fact that as this "victory" as Gerecht defines it, in addition to obviously representing a monumental climbdown from each and every one of the numerous justifications previously offered for the war, does not actually add up to "an Iraqi state" as much as to "a series of armed militia communities we're going to call Iraq," was this outcome really worth 4,000 American dead, over 28,000 wounded, and, by the end of 2008, some $600 billion in American treasure? Was it worth over half a million Iraqi dead, many times that maimed, and some 3 million displaced? Was it worth creating an open source laboratory for terrorists to develop and sharpen their tactics against the most technologically advanced military in the world, enabling them disseminate those tactics around the world via internet? Was it worth losing a thousand dollars at poker just to win twenty at blackjack?

The remainder of the article takes neocon propaganda to the level of farce. Gerecht tries to put the best possible face on President Bush's flawed, ugly, and incoherent Middle East policy, which stumbles forward as courtiers like Gerecht trail behind, praising the monarch for his genius and assuring him that the blighted wasteland he surveys is a verdant oasis.

(cross-posted to TAPPED)

Yesterday's Terrorist is Today's Linchpin

International Crisis Group has just published a new report entitled "Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge." It's findings are summarized thusly:

The dramatic decline in bloodshed in Iraq – at least until last week’s terrible market bombings in Baghdad – is largely due to Muqtada al-Sadr’s August 2007 unilateral ceasefire. Made under heavy U.S. and Iraqi pressure and as a result of growing discontent from his own Shiite base, Muqtada’s decision to curb his unruly movement was a positive step. But the situation remains highly fragile and potentially reversible. If the U.S. and others seek to press their advantage and deal the Sadrists a mortal blow, these gains are likely to be squandered, with Iraq experiencing yet another explosion of violence. The need is instead to work at converting Muqtada’s unilateral measure into a more comprehensive multilateral ceasefire that can create conditions for the movement to evolve into a fully legitimate political actor.

As I wrote last week, understanding Muqtada al-Sadr's contribution to the drop in violence, and the deal that was made to secure his cooperation, is essential in order to grasp the truth behind the preposterous "success of the surge" that John McCain and other conservatives are selling. It's not that there hasn't been a drop in violence, there has been, but given the new reality of Iraq as a warlord state (a reality which the surge strategy has ratified), presenting this drop in violence as anything like the fulfillment of the stated goals of the surge (to say nothing of the original goals of the Iraq project as a whole) is deeply and shamefully dishonest.

We Do Not Negotiate With Terrorists

Newsweek reports on Muqtada al-Sadr's role vis-a-vis the surge:

Gen. David Petraeus has been deservedly praised for tamping down violence in Iraq, but an unlikely character deserves some credit—Sadr. Five months ago the firebrand cleric ordered his followers to lay down their arms, and they've largely obeyed...American officers now talk about "splitting the seams" within the Shiite militia—working with moderates in the group to isolate the radicals, similar to the strategy adopted to tame the Sunni insurgency.

[...]

The hope is that this kind of bottom-up reconciliation will push senior Sadrist leaders toward moderation, too...But things could just as well turn out badly. If Sadr achieves the rank of ayatollah, he will be a heavyweight political, as well as religious, authority—and he'll have a leaner, more loyal militia at his disposal. Ambassador Ryan Crocker has drawn comparisons between Sadr's movement and Hizbullah, which does not bode well for long-term stability.

I think this gets it backwards in a couple of ways. First, Muqtada's already a heavyweight political authority; what he lacks are the religious credentials that would really allow him to play for all the marbles. This is why he has resumed his religious training to achieve the rank of marja al-taqlid, a formally accredited source of religious emulation, authorized to issue binding decisions regarding appropriate Islamic practice for his followers.

Second, recognizing that very little that's occurring in Iraq right now "bodes well" for long-term stability, I think Ryan Crocker's comparison of the Sadr movement to Hizbullah is actually an argument in favor of engagement with Hizbullah (and Hamas). For years the U.S. tried to ice Sadr out of the process, refusing to see that he spoke for a genuine constituency. So he played spoiler, steadily accruing political capital both through his opposition to the U.S. occupation and his movement's delivery of services and security that the occupation failed to provide. General Petraeus was wise enough to perceive, as U.S. and Israeli leaders have unfortunately not been in regard to Hizbullah and Hamas, that, the Sadrist's constant rhetoric notwithstanding, there were elements within the movement which could be negotiated away from violence and toward political accommodation, however halting and precarious that accommodation. This isn't to say that the arrangement that the U.S. seems to have worked out with Sadr is ideal, it certainly is not, just that it's precisely the sort of deal that we're supposed to believe is out of the question in regard to Hizbullah and Hamas (and Iran, for that matter). 

More importantly, though, understanding the deal the U.S. has made with Sadr is key to understanding what the surge strategy is really all about, and why treating the surge as representing any kind of "success" for the Iraq war is a bit like celebrating winning twenty dollars at blackjack right after having lost a thousand at poker. In exchange for Muqtada's cooperation in reigning in the more extreme elements of his militia and his help in reducing violence from staggering to merely unacceptable levels, the U.S. has effectively ratified his control of a large, formerly mixed areas of Baghdad, secured his position as arguably Iraq's most popular Shi'ite political leader, and consigned thousands of Iraqis to life under a proto-state regime of religious fundamentalism that is about as authoritarian as Saddam's was, but with the added bonus of no liquor, no movies, and with women forced to veil themselves and and prohibited from skilled professions. And, as a double-bonus: This regime is oriented toward Shi'ite Iran.

Same Old Sadr Dance

Cernig comments on reports that Muqtada al-Sadr may extend the cease fire he declared in late August. (Via Eric Martin.)

Meanwhile, Cap'n Ed puzzles over why Sadr continues to refuse to play his assigned part in the "decline into political obsolescence" narrative that the Cap'n and so many other conservative scribes have persisted in writing lo these many years.

Sadr has proven a wily foe in Iraq, and one has to wonder what he hopes to gain from this decision. No one really understood his sudden decision to adopt the cease-fire, either, except that he had already tried fighting a smaller American force and lost badly. Sadr didn't want to give the US another reason to go after him personally, and in fact fled the country when the surge started.

[...]

One hint may be in his new enthusiasm for his religious studies. He has long wanted to be taken seriously as a cleric, but lacked the formal training that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has, as well as his standing. Sadr, who got marginalized by Nouri al-Maliki this year as a politician, wants to extend his influence through Islam, and it looks like he's willing to be patient about it.

Yes, the Cap'n actually used the word "wily," a classic bit of old-timey colonialist jargon usually deployed when the sahib has been conned out of his watch. After all, Sadr's only a local Arab (and a turbaned one at that!) and therefore must be described as "wily," or "crafty," or perhaps "sly," and sometimes, on weekends, "cunning."  He cannot ever be "intelligent,"  "astute," or just plain old "more knowledgeable about his own country and its political contours than the former exiles and foreign governments trying to run it." No, never that.

As I wrote back in October, Sadr's stand-down order was consistent with a pattern he had set over the last few years, in which he periodically pulled back to allow rogue elements of his militia to be picked off by coalition forces. I think his more formal announcement of a cease-fire in August is explained by the significant threat to his reputation that existed after his Mahdi Army was blamed for the Karbala violence that occurred days earlier.

In regard to the contention that Sadr was "marginalized by Nouri al-Maliki," this article  in this morning's Washington Post suggests the opposite: Maliki's government, and, more significantly, the Najaf clerical establishment which has supported it, has seen its influence diminished, while Sadr's continues to grow. It's no secret why: whether it's electricity, food, gasoline, or security, Jamaat al-Sadr delivers. General Petraeus understood this, which is why he took steps to fold the movement into his Baghdad security strategy, and credited Sadr with helping to curb violence there.

This Is What the Surge's Success Looks Like

This article in yesterday's Washington Post on Iraqi refugees returning to Baghdad was accompanied by this graphic of the new sectarian make-up of the city. Comparing Baghdad's sectarian distribution in April 2006 to November 2007, we see a city completely transformed, with a majority of the formerly mixed neighborhoods now taken over by Shi'is, most of them supported by the guns of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. What the graphic does not show, and the article does not mention, are the concrete walls which have been erected between new Sunni and Shia neighborhoods throughout Baghdad. David Axe reported in April on the walling off of Adhamiyah:

Not everyone was thrilled by the Adhamiyah barrier. "This will deepen the sectarian strife and only serve to abort efforts aimed at reconciliation," a Sunni shop owner told The New York Times. Noting such objections, [General David Petraeus' counter-insurgency advisor David] Kilcullen stresses that the walls are temporary. He compares them to tourniquets. "It's something you do when patient is bleeding to death. But you don't leave it there forever or it causes damage."

Eight months later, these tourniquets have been applied throughout Baghdad, essentially making permanent the ethnic cleansing of the last few years, and ensuring that resentments will continue to stymie Iraqi political reconciliation for the foreseeable future. I'd offer that the tourniquet is also an excellent metaphor for the surge itself: It's helped, in some respects, to stop the bleeding, but it's made it impossible to save the leg.